ADDRESS [on East-West trade] by Ambassador Guido Colonna Member of the Commission of the European Economic Community at the John Hopkins University on the 13th of February 1967, in Bologna by unknown
\ 
Al>DBBSS _1 C•111. 0.4~"' ~ef( + tt..u/e.J 
'by -
.Ambaeaa.4oi- Ouid.o Oolomi& 
of the Jurc>pea.n lconomio Oommuni t7 
at the John ~pkina Univerait7 
on the 13th February 1~67t in :Bolcsn& 
"-
To discuss adequately trade betwee~ the Community and Eastern 
Europe, account.must be ta.ken not only ot the economic interests 
inv:olved on both sides, but·a1so ot the overall relationship between 
West -and Fast and of certain specific technical problema. 
Thus I shall.devote a few introductory remarks tot~•· importut. 
cha11ges which ·bave · taken place in th.e · relations with Eaete.rn ~ope. 
Th~eafter I shall describe the development ot,trade with the Fastern 
.. .. t • • • •. ' . 
countries sine• 1958. In a third sectipn of my lectui-e l shall 
discuss the difficulties which arise in trade between a community of 
countries with tree economies and countries where the economy is still 
lai-gely subject to s·tate direetion.: ln my· concluding remarks I shall 
have a look at the future·. · . ... '. 
; . : 
- I ... 
T:t:u.s year is the 20th anniversiu,-y of''the-outbreak of the cold 
-war. 
Br July. 1947 all .. eftort:s to per~uad~ _ijo-ri•t Russia tc;, join in a 
European Recovery Programme supported bf. Ame.rican final).cial·assistu9e 
... ~ . ' .. . 
had tailed. : The.Soviets,had reached the.Qonclusion that t.he Marshall 
. ·, \ .. ,. . . ' . . .. . . . --
Plan was a Trojan Horse designed to desintegrate ~heir.newly Jl.Oquired 
empire~ They also '.·beli•ved that Soviet· i,nflue.nce could .be exte.-nded 
over the whole·· of .~ope and .its. depe_nde_nci~ b1 applying a :policy 
of_ ~ntimilia,t.1.on and ot exploitation o;f _the m~n.:r 4ifficy.J.ti~ .tac•d bJ 
. _ ~estern_ ~rol)ean ·countries, As a res~t,. Moscow tightell.~d i;t-s .grip· 
o~ th~ Eurq~ean c.~~~ries u~d~r 1 ~s. ~ontro-1, .. and th.ese ~cfllle · sheEtr ,? 
satel1ites. Sovie.t policy in reg~d: to the West. beeame "°11tright· 
hostile. The. Iron Curtain had !flllen.on our Continen1;. 
. . • .. f, '' .' . ~ ·• • • . • ... . ~ . . . 
' . • .:: . . . ; •.• ' ... ' • . ~ • ;, ,; . • . '1 • i. . . 
Faced with a real. and immedi~te threat, West~rn Europe ~~ich wu 
. practically defenceless, -c~uld ·o~y tu~n. to: the JJnit4td. St~t.s .. for" . 
p~ot•ctionl . this was granted' a'.nd shortly. aft~~ard~ th~; At,lant.te .. 
Alliance was b~·. · · ... · :~ .. ·: · · · · · ' · · ·.: · · · ·· · · · 
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Thus our Continent became divided into two hostile 
with the East became trade with potential enemies. 
As a result, the two sides followed different 
recovery and development •. 
The·. Western Europeans adopted free conipeti tion as the means to 
secure the best u~e of the resources available to them. Accordingly, 
their mutual economic relations became based on multilateral trade, 
the most favoured nation:clause, multil,ateral payments and later on 
convertibility of. currencies. The Ea~tern nations proceeded instead 
towards rigid compulsory centralized planning, and State directed, 
strictly- bilateral trade• 
It must b.e stressed at this po;Lnt that Western countries have 
never had-a common attitude ;in relation to trade with the East during 
the cold war. This in the circumstances could be considered a weak-
ness:but it was the inevitable res~lt of their freedom of action 
within a group to which they b~J.onged of their own free.choice, and 
of the different interests and views which existed between them on 
this question. All agreed of course that given the situation, exports 
to the East of materials which could add to the military potential 
of their opponents had to be prohibited. But they argued at length 
as to which materials were reall,y to be considered of strategic 
importance. On the other hand, some countries in the West doubted 
very strongly the wisdom of a policy which eventually would consist 
in the sealing off altogether of the East fr6m the process of European 
recoverJ• Furthermore, the ec<:)nomic interests of the various Western 
countries were very different when it came to supplies .from the East. 
,Take·oil tor example. Italy, with no .oil producing areas under her 
control, was• and still is - n~turally inc~ned_to diversify as much 
as possible the sources of supply of this essential raw material, and 
thus secure continuity of supply and a ~ood bargaini~ position on 
prices. . France instead, desiro·us _ to maintain and develop its 
traditional trade with her former colonies, was not in .favour of 
massive Western irnports of oil from the East. In the far North, tiny 
. . ' 
. Iceland, with ~ economy bas,ed almost entirel.y on fish, unable to 
dispo,se of ce~tain' fish ·products· s~oh as fishmeal at-: good prices 
~ .• 
,· 
·,'. \ - . ! 
\-' 
- J .. 
in th~: West.,. could :not be indifferent to Eastern offers of exchanging 
. ;\, ' .. '-· ' ·', 
tishmeal ag~nst oil. 
I:~aly .was in fact the first of the Six members of the Community 
. 
to aooept oil from Soviet .Russia and Rownania as a counterpart of ite 
.exl_)orts •.. 
· Obviously,·~ becotne greatly dependen-t 0.11 essential supplies 
from :the ·East, in ·a situat·ion of c-old war1 entailed for any Western 
country a serious risk: and ·1;.hi:s wa'S generally recogniz~d. 
·:ey ·and large, during the height of the .cold war the West could 
no~ dissociate altogether ±ta commerpial.int~rests f~om the overall 
political tension between tH'~·two camps. The· West ia fac:t never 
really accepted the eeparation trom.Ea.-tern-Europe other.than as a 
' I ' • 
te!JlpOrary event a:nd managed even dui-1,.ng-the most di~fioult years to 
keep ~live )some trade· relations with our Eastern neighb,oure. But 
as iong as the cola war •as on1 even in the West any important 
. •) . . 
departur.e from an attitude of atrict reserve in regard to trade with 
' ' .- . 
. · tQ.e East ·wo'uld acquire, what~yer its ·economic justifications. the 
'. , , ,' , 
.political significanoe of an attempt to establish a neutral status 
,.. ' . . . ~ 
•. ·:·.· 
' t ., 
Opinions vary as t:.o when the.ti~e. (.?f t~e cold war,began to ebba 
Deetalim,zation, the theory of peaceful coexistence, · the doctrine:, 
of' i,9ly-centri.am in the communist world, the highs· a~d 1ows and the ,; . 
~' I ,, > • " 
parado:ic:'es ot the Khruschevia.n era: all.. th8;~e. _events no doubt broke 
the terrible ·spell. ··, ) 
I believe however that the turning point came at the conclusion : ·i; 
· ot the d,ib~ crisis of 1962 .• : .. · 
\.,. :' 
.... 
As ,fie:~all .r~ember, !Qia-ueo~ev bad allowed t~e :crisis .to duelop 
• • h 
up to 'the'poillt··where he ·91-t~er ha.d.,~<;> aocep~ a nuc1ear_ war or with-
.. ! • ' ·., ' • • • 1 ~ ' 
' ·draw. · He .rt,thdi,.e,r. W:l~. his .disgrace be has paid tor the groes 
m1ecalcUlation: o-f tpe risk~-. . B~t · I· ·~~~ot heip, i,eeling. that he 
,deserves. tha pa·tit•<l•. of_~nJdn\:l.• .. H11d ~t not been for this· mus-. 
'' oalculatiQA\: ,JlAfhe~ :9f., t:h .. , two· :g~e~:t nucle~r, p~~~·s :rai~ht haTe . 
• ~. 'f ' . , ' • '.;. . • '.: # ... ' ... \.. '_ :.. . •.'. . • 
.. ·.: . . .· ~, 
J 
realized fully, as they .now do, the tremendous responsibility whi 
accompanies the possession of nuclear weapons. 
Cuba was the starting point tor a development without precedent 
in history. I r:nean the ta.cit acceptance by the Unit•d States and 
the Soviet Union of common rules of international behavio~. While 
their politieal interests remain essentially opposed, bo~h know that 
' th.ey canno~ p~omote these interests beyond a given point without 
having ~o face unacceptable risks. 
This development has had and is having momentous.consequences. 
It .has ~turally entailed a limitation of the influence which the 
Sovi$t Union can eff~ctively exercise in its own camp. No doubt the 
' . 
same can be· said about the position of the United States in regard to 
her Weste1-n allies. But the consequences are far more significant 
for the camp where· solidarity was enforced, and bas-ed on a common 
objective .of world. domination. 
The most spectacular event in this conflict was of course the rise 
of China as an open challenger to Soviet Russia for the leadership of 
the communist world. For Cb,ina, beset with enormou$ eco~omic and 
social problems, and an ancient ambition to acquire a dominating 
posit.ion in Asia, it was
1
impossible to accept a stabilization of the 
worl~ situation existing in 1962. F9r China the revolutionary era 
cou~~ not be considered closed, it was just starting. 
'Pei:haps-i~ the long ~un, ghin~ w,ill become for' the.world a fa:F 
mereseriou,s danger than.Russia ever .was. Anyhow, the.'situation in 
China is at pres~nt m~ch too confused to permit a conciusive assessment. 
But for the time being we, as pe.ace-1o'Ving human beings, can be 
. . 
content with the fact that the single monolithic communist bloc subject 
to irrational and d;angero.us im.pulseir bas ceased to exist: that 
autonomous attitudes based more on national interests and views than 
on bloc political i.ntereiSts. are «gain beoomingposeible. in Eastern 
Europ.e, and that the.· Eastern countries h~ve begun. to loQk in their 
own right for appropriate solutions.to the.P;~obl~ Ql the:l.r relations 
with the V[est. ·· Tugoslavia 4.rio longer the only .exception to the 
' .;: 
iron rule. 
/ ,' , 1:·. 
.··~ 
. \. 1 · 
- i.~ ... 
On the Qther hand,::· the _l«:>ng period of _pe~ce or rather of absence 
of ho~_-war wh;J.ch:w~ have .:enjoy~ci in.Europe since 1945 is bearing fruit. 
New ~enerations are eoming up, both in.'- the East and in '.the West, 
~heir minds.far more open to.the fasc~hating problems of the second 
ind,istrial,rev;olution, and of a rational.·organization of this new 
world of ou~s, than.to the fanatic defence of ·a given ideology or the 
, . 
support of policy of power and supremacy • 
... 
The industriali.tation of the East has brought e.~out a diversific-
ation of the economies which in turn has given ris~ to ~he problem 
.. of securiug a rational balance between the various economic activities 
in the absence of profit as a regulator. Expansion in developing 
_countries entails·a rising demand which 09:npot be satisfied except 
by tr.ade with the industrialized countries which can ·deliver the 
' goods. The gradual rise in the standard of living ot the people, 
• .. • t • - •• ' 
· the great increase _in general education which· has taken place in the 
East, the ~owledge about living conditions of the work~ng classes 
in the Western countries have resulted in a growing demand for 
consumer goQds which, in the absence of tension, cannot be long 
disregarded. .As soon·~s enforced discipline relaxes, people become 
critical. Thus criticism of res(?urC~ w~ste is b&eoming more and more 
·oJ>en. For.instance, how ,mueh of tl,le 97 millio~ tons of steel 
' . ... . ., 
produced in the Soviet Union in 1966 was wasted in us~iess conventional 
. ·. 
a~~ents whereas it could have found its way into the production of 
motorcars and refrigerators·? 
Tradi tilonal dogmas,. such as ,compulsory·:plannin~ 'and. the over-
;~ r:tding importance ,o_f h~avy :industry ov.~r .th~: ·produ~tion .of the 
cahsumer goods, are no longer intangible. Distinguished Soviet 
' . ' . •·. . . . . 
ec0:nomtsts . .have red.iscov'.ei;e~, the theory that profit is indispensable 
.for. tl:\e. heal.t~1 °dev4opl1l'ePt .. o:f,' an economy and are .now att.empting to 
.redo.ncii~ thi~ new the,9ry '4,th ~urrent planning ·P~~ctic~a'. · Some 
2000 enterpriees1 , per~p~:~9~e, will be adjusted 1~·1967 to a system 
:;. ·,. .Q:f IJl~~gement based on .PZ:9.~J..ti, .and this chang/will ~ffect several 
.... · million wo~kers. 
' .• , ,i': • ,' ¥.';1. • ............ . 
·As ... ~ega;ef~ fo:eign ··t:t'~cle~· .the· Soviet":eff'orts, to ,creat.e in 1962, 
. : •' . '•. ~. : ·. . ·>, . ; .. , 
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as a counterpart to the European Economic Community a system of 
·1ntrasocialist economic· integratio~ seem to have failed. Inte 
as conceived then, meant a common production and t~ade plan wit 
which each partner of the C.A.E.M (or COMECON) was to be allotte 
production quota of given goods, related to its availability of r 
materials or of technicians and skilled labour. The planning was 
to be centralized in Moscow: it seemed evident that the Soviet Union 
would have tried to manage the plan with a view to maintain every 
other participa~ing country in a situation of enforced dependence on 
the group. 
This approach was flatly rejected by Roumania, and in 1963 the 
scheme was tacitly transformed into a loose framework for bilateral 
negotiations_. This meant the end.of the central planning idea and 
the victory of national economic interests of the various Eastern 
partners over bloc political objectives. An inte.rnational economic 
bank which had been set up to ·support Ea.stern 1ntegration with a 
system of multilaterai payments and short term credits. has had so far 
little to do. 
In Sovie't Russia itself a new ruling class has e*1erged which seems 
to have a sober notion of national interests and appears desirous and 
capable of using traditional diplomacy for the promotion of these 
interests. 
These changes would probably not have occurred had the West not 
followed over the last two decades an overall policy mixing firmness 
a,nd flexibility. The West stood firm in the defence of freedom and 
in resisting intimidation and pressure from outside and from within. 
There were however always some Western countries willing to make an 
effort to ease tension and never did the West attempt to use its 
force to impose the solution of outstanding problems in Europe, such 
as Berlin and the division of Germany. This policy kept the peace 
without surrender. Peace in freedom has made it possible for Western 
I 
Europe to achieve economic- and s.ocial progress on a scale never known 
before. These results were achieved through economic and commercial 
policies which were essentially liberal. Above·a11, secure under 
the protection of the Alliance, Western Europe proved capable of 
--~ 
' \,.' 
launching a· process d~ 'gradual' economic int'egrati.o.n•'Of nations. 
This' ini~grat'io'n was based 'On 'a -ttura.bl~ r.e~onciliation between 
countries which had been fi-ghting each oilier for centuries. and 
~ntailed t~e .acceptance_of a growing degree of interdependence, and 
the leadership of common democratic institutions: 8Jl. integration open ) 
to trade and competition with the whole world and oommitted to 
peaceful objectives. 
The resu~ts achieved ~y the European Communi~y since 1952 and 
in par~icular since 19.58 o~ the economic arid· social plan have certainl.1 .. · 
. shaken the convictions held in the East ever since the famous speech 
by Stalin on the contradiction _of capitalism. 
It was evident that with Western Europe emerging as one of' the 
greatest ec.~nomic powers of the w.orld there could be no certainty 
that a new economic crisis would inevitabl,y was}). away the very 
foundations- ·of· our civ.ilization. Thus. while at the outset the 
launching of European economic ·integration· was condelnned in the East 
as one more aggressive -W.ioern device directed against our neighbour,., 
: .' . 
b7;962, attitudes had changed, as revealed by surveys of Soviet 
experts and specialists. · Besides, it must have.oc~urred to the 
v,'' 
Soviets that the growing econ6mio interdependence·Of.·the.S:i,~ countries 
has had a stabilizing effect ·on general.conditions cm our eontinent: 
and th~s ,_may have been welcome at a time when Asia was -beginning to be 
a cau,se of s.eriou.e concern to Russia. The !orce ~f attraction 
,xercis~4 by ~he Community on its Western E~oi,ean.::tieighbours, the 
. . ' 
manifest desire. of countries which· are beyond su.·~pi..cibn as regards 
their attachment to peace such as Great Britain and the Scandinavians, 
to becotne members.et th,CoJnmunity, the emergence in Italy and later 
.. :fil Germany .ol' left-centre Governments, th~ foreign ~licy .9f the 
'French :Gcvern.m'ent: · all these fa,cts cannot but confirm' i~ Soviet minds 
.. ) ' ,. ~ ; . . . 
J ' > •• 
~he notion that the Community - in the light of present ci~cumstances -
i,s an asset from their point of view • 
.. . ~. . 
J. '; -·II• 
. :.., l ,,· .......... ' 
Let us .now analyse the development of trade.with Eaetern Europe 
sinoe 1958. 
- 8 .... 
Trade between the ~uropean Community and the members of C.A 
has amounted in .. 1965 to about 3 billion dollars, an increase of 
over the 1958 level. 
1966. 
This trend ·towards rapid expansion was further accentuated in 
In the first 9 months of 1966 the increase over the same 
period in 1965 has been 18%, while it was 16% in 1965 in relation to 
1964. 
The expansion of trade with the East has been more rapid than the 
expansion·of the total foreign trade of the Community. Total foreign 
trade increased in 1966 by only 9%, the same as in the previous year. 
This performance compares with the development ·Of trade between 
Great Britain and Eastern Europe. This amounted in 1965 to 940 million 
dollars, an increase of 126% over the 1958 level. Naturally, in 
absolute terms the volume of trade between the Community and Eastern 
Europe is three times greater. 
There are also other differences. 
The Community is more or less in balance in her trade with the 
Eastt whiie, the United Kingdom is heavily in deficit, imports having 
just about the double of British exports in 1965. 
London, as a world market for raw materials, and Sterling as an 
.international currency, are obviously attractive for Eastern countries 
desirous of earning Sterling for their purchases in the Sterling area 
and in the West. 
There is also·a different <li~tribution of trade, The Soviet j 
Union arid Poland represented in 1965 71% of Britain,• s total trade with 
Eastern Europe while for the Community these two countries represented 
48%~ 
The trend is however towards a more even ~istribution of the 
United Kingdom's trade with the Eastern countries, a further indication 
of a more autonomous development of the various national economies in 
the East. 
.,. 
' 
- ~ ' . ~ :. " 
~ ... !.'" 
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'rhis bei~ s~id, ,~t-ade. with Easter??,, countries still represent~ 
only a .minor fractiqn of the total trade of the Comm~ty: . the '-' 
pel;'centage .in.the last five years has been between 5~30 and 5.50. 
... . 
:Trade with the,·West has' been more important for the East. In 1964 
trade with the Community constituted 6% of the total trade of the 
Soviet Union and i2% of the- totals trade -of Hungary. . By and large 
' however~ trade·with the West is still - percentage wise·- of marginal 
importance for the Eastern countries. 
In strictly economic and commercial terms-, Western trade with the 
East is subjec·t to the availability in the East ot means of payment 
!or their purchases in the West. · 
Now the Eastern countries have seen their. traditional role as 
·· suppliers to the West· tor certain essential raw mat-erials and basic 
goo'ds substantially reduced. 
This is true for grains, meat and.cattle, because of successive 
bad harvests• poo·r produ.eti ve organization, increased internal 
~ con'sumpt;iQnt and rapid expansion of .the production .i.n Weste:n Europe, 
in.particular in the Community, and of the interpenetration of the 
s1,;:' Market's. . . · 
. " It is equally tr.ue for coal, which mu·at now compete on Western 
ma7-kets M<?r~.and more with oil and natural ·gas· and cheap American 
coal1 While Western d·emand for oil, timber· and 'certain metals tencle to 
remain stable. 
Thus a development. pf. trade with the East is: condi~.;l.onal on an 
. '~ '. :- . . . . 
effort by the Eastern .countries to· improve the.i~ productivity in 
agriculture .and to develop the indus.trial .:rtroduc~io~ in 'or.d.er to 
compete with the highly sophisticated products which the West is now 
. / 
accustomed to: : and also ·to adopt modern method& of' .marketing. 
There are indications that this can be done. The establishment 
. ·hy'·the ·c~mmunitf ot' a :c'O~moh agricultural ·policy is not having 
iie.ga'tive: effe;:t~~ 0~ the· export ·tracle of our Ea~te:rn neighbours. 
Whenever· goods have be·en" offered at fair· ·prices and in competitiYe 
. .. ' .. ~ .... 
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conditions of quality, trade has flourished. Thus Polish expor 
of pork to the Community_ went up in. 1963-6lf. from 9 to 14 million 
d~llars and other Eastern countries likewise improved their posi 
Poland has also improved her position as an exporter of meat. 
On the industrial plane1 chemical :µnports from the East in 
went up 2($ and imports of machinery and transport equipment 19% over 
the previous year. 
By and large howeYer, trade tends to develop .mor.e rapidly between 
countries having reached a comparable state of economic development. 
This is why the total foreign trade of the Community is conducted in 
larg~ part with the otherhigh)¥ industrialized areas of the world. 
The development of trade with the East is conditional therefore 
in the short term on a liberal import policy of the. w·est on a 
reasonably liberal Western credit policy in support o'f exports, in 
particular capital goods, and in the long run on the willingness and 
capability of the Eastern economies to attract Western demand to the 
extent necessary to balance Eastern demands for Western goods. 
Let us now have a look at the trend in Westernimport and·credit 
policies toward the East. 
Great Britain was one of the first countries in,the West to engage 
in a policy of active promotion of trade with the East.· She 
concluded in 1959, while- the cold war was still on, a five year 
agreement with Soviet Russia, according to which the open general 
licence system, which is equivalent to the liberalization of imports, 
was. extended to Russian goods. Similar agreements were concluded 
with other ,European countries and haYe since been renewed. 
Within the Community there have been recently a series of very 
important developments. 
France has abo1ished import restrictions on 817positions out of 
the 1097 positions of the common external tariff in regard to all 
Eastern countries, with the ex.ception of the Soviet •occupied zone in 
Germany. Germany has liberat.ed 650 pos_itions for imports from 
t 
' 
\ 
; . 
.· 
.\ 
:. ll. .:. . 
Poland, _Roumania, Cze.choalovakia and Hungar7. The Benelux countriea 
hat'e practically li'berated 10~4 ·positions• that.:i,s almost -the whole 
• y ·- • • / ' 
lot• f~r imports from all Eastern eoun~ri~s. Italy has r·emained 
more conservative: only 200 positions he.ve peen liber.ated for import• 
from a1i. Eastern countrj,es w.i th· the exoe,pti<>n of the zone, while 150 
ad:dition~l positions have.been liberated fpr imports from certain 
.. 
Eastern countr"i.es only. 
Whenever trade remains suqject to ,import _restrictions, it is 
. . 
regulated within-the framework of bilateral agreements. There are 
some I+o·bilatera.l agreements in existence between the.Six countries 
of ~b.'e Community and the. Ea.stern countri~~. 
Be.side.a, .because of the difficulties, to which :t shall come later, 
arisin.g. from tra~ing with State trading countrtest c.erta:i.n .safeguards 
are necesita.~y when import· restrictions; are abolish·ed. 
. ... . . 
· .The trend in current.Western import policies from the East is 
thus towards ipore and m~~e liberal.ism, but there are considerable 
.. ~ ' . . . . \ . . .. 
differences between the Western countries - even within the Community• 
'bbt·h· as co·ricerns, tb·e extent. o.f the lieberalization and the nature of 
. the. safeguard· process. •.. · ... 
- : ·' 
To complete the picture, I should add that an Fast-West trade 
r~la'.tion~ Act ·,has··been,pending before Congress since Ma.y 1966 which, 
if apP;oved, would ,empo.wer the Presid.ent of the United _States to apply .... 
~d·~~ certain_ COriditi6US fWd· W~thi~ cert~in. limits.- the. JD,OSt favoured 
nation clause for tariff reductions. :to ,J!lastern European countries other 
·· ·than l'Ugoslavia and Polan.d, for wh;i.ch the authority already exists. 
Finall~1 the list ·,C:,f goo
0ds for: which export to the East is 
prohib'ited for defence reasons h~s .been considerab_ly reduced. It is· 
s_ignificant ··that the Unit~d ·,States h.a$ ~ecent1y decided to supply 
,. . ,, .. •,• . •' ... ,:.~·. :. .. . 
RoumaniQ: •ith an atomic reactor. 
As con'derns Wi3ster:n. export. or.e4.~ t , poU.cy, there have also been 
imi:lor.tant de-velopments, · and_;here .. too: G;~at Britain has played a leading 
. . .. ; . \. . '~ ... : .;~ . _.~.. '. ~ 
rol.c:i'. · ·· .. .. . = · . 
.. ·.; .. 
' ~:: 
·, .. : .; ··:::: 
. , Y,, 
·,.: 
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There exists since 1934 an institution usually referred to 
Berne Club, established with a view to harmonizing the export er 
policies of its members, and thus preventing them from engaging i 
mutually ruinous competition for gaining foreign outlets. In 1962 
the Club expressed itself in favour of a rule according to which the 
member governments would abstain from extending their guarantee to 
export credits granted to Eastern countries exceeding five years: 
any member wishing to exceed this time limit was to engage in previous 
consultations with the Club. The Six members of the Community, all 
members of the Club, adopted this rule insofar as they were concerned. 
Great Britain refused however to accept any limitation to her 
discretionary power for deciding the terms under which trade would be 
promoted in any direction: and strongly objected to any discrimination 
between importing countries, whether Eastern or not. · Accordingly, 
the United Kingdom has recently granted guaranteed export credits 
to Eastern countries up to 12 and even 15 years. 
The Berne rule having been broken, it was inevitable that other 
Western countries would follow suit. 
Actually, the United States itself has gra~ted credits for large 
supplies of grains to Soviet Russia, and the atomic .reactor deal with 
Roumania was also on favourable credit terms. 
Very recently there have been a series of impo,rtant decisions 
taken by Governments and industries in. the Community. FIAT has agreed 
to supply Soviet Russia with an automobile factory worth some 300 
million dollars under state guarant~edexport credits up to 8 and a 
half years. The time limit is to start from the date a.t which the 
fac.tory begins functioning. 
Renault has made a similar agreement with Soviet Russia, although 
for a more limited amount, for the supply of machinery required for the 
rationalization of existing automobile factories. 
Olivetti General Electric has concluded a basic agreement with the 
Sovi.et States organization .for the co-ordination of import~ in the 
Soviet Union of industrial equipment. In the framework of this agree-. 
ment and on credit terms yet to Q8 discussed, electronic equip~ent and ! 
~ 
I 
~ 
I 
\; 
\ 
!,. -
and equipment for the installation of factori,es.ot computers and 
typing machines will be supplied ;or a sum o~ ·so'1e 65 ~illion dollars:. 
' . ' . : 
Necchi is planning to supply equipment for a shirt 1 factory in 
Rouniania. ' 
Si,milar agreements are being contemplated by West German firms 
. 9r b;y German and French fi,rms in jo':i.nt ventures. 
Again we must conclude.that Western policy on export credits is 
bec;oming. more ana more open; individual attitudes however are fairly 
diffe~·ent' from country to country • 
... III -
These differenc.es of attitude lead me to the third section of my 
lecture: in which I shall discuss certain technical difficulties whith 
a.rise in connection. with trade between co'fntri-es with different 
·eoonomic systems. 
These difficulties can become very serious in the case of free 
economy c·ountries bound ,tog•ther in a. o~mmon m~rket s_uch as the 
members of the European Community. 
The origin of the probl•'11 is that.prices .in free economies and i~ 
. . . ~. 
state ms.paged economies are ·not ;formed, in the SaDte way and do not rneu 
tlie same thing. In free economies,. prices a..r,e th,e result· of the free; 
competit'ion. between producers, and of the cost. of the factors o:£ 
production. In state·dtrected economies, priQes are fixed by the 
State authorities., ·according to the conveniences of the.ir overall 
policies, and this. applie.-a .. both to the products al,ld to the factors of, . 
production. Thus goo~s offered by. State trading count~ies for export:~ 
can be priced irrespective of th~ir cost: but tb.ere is actually, in 
. . . . 
' ' . 
State managed economies, no real internal prices with which export 
prices .can be compared so that dumping pract~ces can be detected. 
( 
..... 
'· · ·Western. countries. al>id~ .,b7. the x,1,1.es of GAT~: ~nt~r alia the 
' • < • ' •• ' '-., ·1, , •• , • •"'·· ••• ' 
rules. agretrd · wi:thin.G'Arit, tor .. CO{Ult~raf t;i.ng suoh p~act.ices. But these . 
. . . , . . .. l • . .. · . . . . 
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rules are designed to apply to free economy countries where price 
formed as a result of the natural forces o~ the market. These ru 
are therefore of no avail in regard to trade with the East: and, 
wise, tariff protection, calculated to maintain a reasonable 
between industrialized and developed free economy countries, has 
little meaning in trade with the East. 
Thus the Western countries, including of course the members of 
the European Community, have had to resort to special measures for 
protecting themsel.ves., whenever imports were ,free, and even when imports 
were subjeqt to quotas, from the risk that Eastern countries might 
offer goods at prices with which their own producers could not possibly 
compete. 
In general, Western countries have reserved for themselves the 
right immediately to re-establish quantitative restrictions on any 
product, or to stop imports altogether, whenever th~ prices at which 
goods were imported entails serious risks of disruption for their own 
production. There are however Western countries whose attitude is 
more 'lenient, and who by and large have not gone further 1;:han the GATT 
rules. 
As I have said, these differences entail a sei-ioµs risk for the 
common market. 
On the 1st of July 1968 the customs l,lnion of th'e Six members of 
the Community will be completed. This means that by that date almost 
all industrial and agricultural goods spall circulate within the 
Community without customs duties or levies or quota restrictions. 
This free circulation will apply not only to goods produced in the 
Community, but also to goods imported into any member country of the 
Community from the outside, on the condition that the duty. provided by 
the common external tariff, or the levy prescribed by the regulations 
of the common agricultural policy will have beeri paid. 
The Treaty of Rome does prescrib~ that the member countries 
harmonize their commercial policy: that is their import policy from 
third countries, their poliey onsafeguards against dumping, and their 
export credit policy. This obligation howe.ver does not ·apply, 
;. . ' 
... -
. . ~ 
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acc·ording to ·the Treaty, until the· end of the transitional period, 
th~t is unt.il. the end· or· '69. · Thus a potentia'l conflict has arisen 
between the ~apid ·establishment· of th~ Common Market, ·which will come 
into existence one and a halt years 'in advance of the scrhedule, fore-
seen by the TreatY, and the ·freedom of action ··which member countries 
have retained. in their commercial policy. 
The Treaty does contain rules according tc>'- which· any member 
; 
c~untry can protect itself against decisions of commercial policy 
'tai<ei:i by anothe'r member country which ·may have harmful· effects on its 
own market. - Th:1:s means that :t:n 'certain ·cases one countr1 can re-
establish import restrictions towards other member countries. 
Take- for instance the recent measures of libera.li,zation adopted 
by the member countries·. Franc-e, although very g,enerous,. has ex-
. eluded from liberalization of imports from the East most of its 
agrieultur.al ·and textile products. The Germans have liberalized in 
particular the chemical, mechanical ~nd eiectro--technicai sectors. 
Italy ·has liberalized in practice only ,importe o·t raw- materials of 
essential importance for her economy. 
The reason for these differences is evident. Each country in 
the Community has still her .. own.problems and interests. The Six 
have not reached yet. the stage of an economic. unio:p.. . Thus Germany, 
for instance, may be interested in opening her market to imports from 
the Eaa·t of oertain equipment wliich Italy may on the contrary wish 
to .. maintain reetrieted. As'Germany is· freei for the time ·being, to 
.. mak.e her own commerciai policy decisions• Italy must be free under 
certain conditions to res'lirict imports from Germany-.of these Eastern 
· goods even if the .·q,uties have been paid. 
. 4{ . .. , ~ ... ~ . . . . ' ,. ~ 
. Anybody can see thnt 1t member·eoutr.ies were to adopt 
, . 
· treque.n~ly- m,asur,ea of· :t;hia kind .in qrder to protect themselves from 
• . "•· ' '.' • !, 
.the .comme.rcia.l policy of one .another, the very foundation of the 
. ' \ . ; . 
Common Market would be shaken. 
. ihe spie reasoni~ .applies when (liberalization being.at the same 
C ' ",• , R;C , • ' < i, :i• :' , , , . • ' .·• ' t ' , ·. ': .- f, S •~ •• ; 
. levttli,) ~af,guards are dif'fer~nt a~d ar~ applied ll'ith different 
}, .,_ ,, • V • < < • ( •_.- " • '•' '• ,• , • • _, ~' • • t.: ' 0 • ' ! •~ : ' ' 
severit1 by the various me112ber countries; 
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In regard to export credit policy, it is quite evident that if 
member countries were to align the~selves indiscriminately on the 
most generous Western country,. the result would be a ·progressive f 
, deterioration of the conditions under which the Co~unity could se~ul\e. J 
outlets for her exports. An excessive liberalism and lack of harmoni~~,.t · 
zation would weaken the overall bargaining position of the Community. 
Th:i.s being said it must be recognized that, while there have been 
cases in which Eastern goods have been imported.in West,rn countries 
at abnormally low prices, Eastern export prices have been recently, as 
a rule~ at a reasonable level. As a result, safeguar~ measures have 
been ~pplied fairly seldom. This is perhaps the result of the fact 
that our Eastern neighbours are introduc.ing the notion of profit and 
productivity in their economic planning, and that they want to secure 
a durable access on the Western.markets. 
Still, as long as the Eastern economies shall be subject to State 
direction, there shall remain a problem of adequate safeguards and 
' therefore a problem of harmonization of commercial policy of the 
Community countries. 
- IV -
Let us now have a glimpse at the future. 
The European Community believes in the development of inter-
national trade in, any direction. She must however secure the 
stability of the Common Marke·t, and achieve the economic union of its 
members. 
Thus, the Community ought as a matter· of priority to establish a 
common commercial policy. 
The Eastern countries ought to recognize this necessity and 
renounce their political objections to negotiating with.the Community 
as a unit. 
The rapid development of trade between the Community'and Eastern 
Europe since 1958 indicates that there is a potential convergence of 
f 
\ 
: ,·.: 
~
·'·· .. ··· 
' 
: 
••:. 
!rhis is n'o'.t· surprisi.ng be9~:\1i$.e(the· Ea.stern E~p~ countries have 
l'each~d a relatively ·high;, l.e~el of industrial d•velop111e~t $lld. the 
Community has emerged as a most powerful economic entit1; .. she is the 
first.importer and the second exporter in the world. 
· Because trade with thet :Ee.at is still ot ~gina;L i.Jraportance to 
' ' 
both sides, there ·seems to be ample margin for furtller development: 
th'"s efforts both by ·th& Community and the Eas,t to i'ind adequate 
solutions to 'the technical problems I have mentioned, would be worth 
while. 
Prelintina.ry steps have· 'bee~ taken in .this direct~on.. A procedal"e 
of consultation has been set up by .the Six concerning negotiations 
by any member country of a commercial agreement with a third countr1. 
This procedu.ra'ha.e helped creating among' the ~u the consciousness 
' . ) 
that 'their COlllmercial and economic.1·r$lations with third: CQu~tries are 
a matter of co'neern for all~ 
, ... · 
B~t the time has come to take bolder steps. Member countries 
·s~ould decide to harmonize their national ·commercial policies with a 
,,:iew to'estabiisl:ling a' common.level of lib'eralization•ot imports, to 
setting up id~ntic.al safeguard measures and to 'defiui~ reasonable 
export er.edit terms • 
. · .The comm(?a ·level .of liberalizati.;,n:: should be set aa high, ae 
possibl.e,.acco~t being tak~n ot·t];J.e ~pec:\~l. situation· of every single 
member country. Whenever imports could not be liberalized, member 
' ' 
coun.tries should agree on impo'r't quotas· tor th·e ·Communitt taken as a 
' unit. 
... As i,egarda;·export CX"edit policies, a procedure.;<>~ consu3.:tation 
·:1,etw.:en member "OO\intries ha$· ,be.en· equ.all7. ,,e:t .1up. _ · 1The· next:. ~tep 
should be the· adoption of a c;,ommOf:1 ·.atti,tµde. ~e 0()IDIIIUJ;l,i,ty,.~ould 
consider this question from the point of view ot the best use of its 
available resources, and the call on these resources by internal 
demand, and by the need of providing as~istanoe to the developing 
countrie~ throughout the world. 
/ 
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Finally as c.ono.erns safeguards again.at economic and market dis-
ruption, the Community should adopt common measures intended in the 
first plai,, to discourage abno.rmal practices by Eastern exporters, and 
adequate; to ·afford ·the requir,~ ,protection. 
The conclus.ive st.ep should take the form of agreements concluded 
by the Communit1 - and not any more by its individual m~bers - with 
the various liaste-rn countries, withinan international.framework such 
as GATT, if these countries-were to become members of the institution, 
on the bilate-ral p1an 
The Eastern countries seem in general to be more responsive to 
these requirements than could.be expected from them a few years ago • 
. The easing of the tension between East and West makes it possible. 
Naturallythe·situation. varies from country to country. __ 
T~us PQland a~d Czechoslovakia take part in the Kennedy Round 
•here the Community negotiatN as a unit: Poland has also 
established technical contacts with the Community- and has become a 
member of GATT • Hungary has been agreed in GATT as an observer-. 
The decision by Roumania to establish diplomatic relations with 
the Federal Republic is a new very importan~ development in the 
direotion of the return to normal· conditions in the relationship with 
Eastern Europe, notwithstanding the lack to date of a solution of the 
problem of the division ot Germany. It is impossible to assess as yet 
the implications of-this decision: but it certainly seems to be a 
decision 1n the right direction from both Governments concerned. 
Thus 1967 offers goo_d reasons for hope. The hope will be the 
more justified if the European Community will continue in the months 
and years to come to complete its own achievement in every sense, and 
if othe.i- W.estern .nations will join the Community with a ·view to sharing 
its obligationiJt .i.ts opportuniti~s, and. its. ideals of d.e~ocratic 
t!'leedom and of peac.eful prog~ess. 
:,:·. 
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